Clausewitz on Theory
Though far less known that pre-Marxist philosophers like G.W.F. Hegel or Ludwig Feuerbach, the influence of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz on Marx and Engels is emphasized by Lenin and Zinoviev in their pamplet, “Socialism and War”:
“‘War is the Continuation of Politics by Other’ (i.e., Violent) ‘Means.’ This famous aphorism was uttered by one of the profoundest writers on the problems of war, Clausewitz. Marxists have always rightly regarded this thesis as the theoretical basis of views concerning the significance of every given war. It was precisely from this viewpoint that Marx and Engels always regarded different wars.”1
While Clausewitz’s value naturally seems instrinsically bound to his military focus, we can take more from his monumental work, On War, than strategic and tactical precepts. As with the philosophical import attributed to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, the development of On War contains the growth of German Idealism in the early 1800s, echoing the positive trajectory of human knowledge outlined beforehand by Hegel:
“Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.”2
Clausewitz sees how knowledge goes from laborious study to standardized education to off-hand knowledge at an ever-increasing scale. This motion exists at the heart of positive freedom in terms of mass education, but it is also inherent to the process which arms revolutionaries seeking to establish the democratic conditions which allow this dissemination of knowledge. Marxist-Leninists rightfully repeat ad naseum that our “Ism” is not an ossified set of rules but a fluid scientific method. Clausewitz defined theory in this exact same manner:
“If the theorist’s studies automatically result in principles and rules, and if truth spontaneously crystallizes into these forms, theory will not resist this natural tendency of the mind. On the contrary, where the arch of truth culminates in such a keystone, this tendency will be underlined. But this is simply in accordance with the scientific law of reason, to indicate the point at which all lines converge, but never to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield. Even these principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take.”3
Clausewitz does not reject the value of doctrines produced by critical inquiry, but he attaches their value to a frame of reference which produces practical effects when correctly interpreted according to specific conditions, rather than a royal road which can be dutifully followed. Marxist-Leninist principles such as the vanguard party or democratic centralism are enormously beneficial products of the theoretical development spanning roughly from Marx and Engels to Lenin, but these products remain secondary to the scientific method which produced them. The danger of not treating these results as crystallizations meant to be refined for the current era is interpreted by Clausewitz as an example of the subjective factor in the military making of history—where tragedy moves into farce with the disappearence of historical necessity:
“Yet it would neither be possible nor correct to eliminate subjective routine or personal style entirely from the conduct of war. They should be seen, rather, as manifestations of the influence exerted on individual phenomena by the total character of the war—an influence which, if it has not been foreseen and allowed for by accepted theory, may find no other means of adequate expression. What could be more natural than the fact that the War of the French Revolution had its characteristic style, and what theory could be expected to accomodate it? The danger is that this kind of style, developed out of a single case, can easily outlive the situation that gave rise to it; for conditions change imperceptibly. That danger is the very thing a theory should prevent by lucid, rational criticism.”4
Hence, Clausewitz attributes prime importance to the role of criticism in military theory, and the section of On War devoted to theory centers the need to keep it from ossifying through rigorous logical inquiry. However, this certainly does not mean that Clausewitz veers towards the “book-worship” attitude towards theory which Marxist-Leninists avoid by seeking its unity through practice. It would be difficult for Clausewitz to make this error given the distinctly pragmatic confines of his military focus, but he goes further by commenting on the self-destructive nature of theory divorced from practical utility:
“But it is inevitable that all the terminology and technical expressions of a given system will lose what meaning they have, if any, once they are torn from their context and used as general axioms or nuggets of truth that are supposed to be more potent than a simple statement. Thus it has come about that our theoretical and critical literature, instead of giving plain, straight arguments in which the author at least alwats knows what he is saying and the reader what he is reading, is crammed with jargon, ending at obscure crossroads where the author loses his readers. Sometimes these books are even worse: they are just hollow shells. The author himself no longer knows just what he is thinking and soothes himself with obscure ideas which would not satisfy him if expressed in plain speech.”5
Compare the writer described by Clausewitz with the simple but decisive style found in Stalin or Mao’s prose. While there is a deficit of theory in the US which could benefit from the more embellished style of Marx or even Trotsky, what Clausewitz identifies here is more essential to the needed revival in this area. For theory to regain respect in the pathologically pragmatic culture of the US, it needs to prove its value through a willingness and ability to weld itself to specific political conclusions explained in straightforward language. In this fashion, Lenin’s most well known theoretical works tend to correspond with a specific phase of the Russian Revolution and a specific action necessary for it—from the call for an “all-Russia newspaper” in What Is To Be Done? to the defence of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder.
Clausewitz helps in our long journey from critical inspection to theoretical conclusions with practical effect. As I’ve previously argued6, his aphorism that war is the continuation of politics by other means contains the implication that political parties can benefit by emulating the strategic thought of military matters. In the same vein, our use of theory is enriched by Clausewitz’s understanding that “it is the task of theory … to study the nature of ends and means”7. A retreat appears as a sign of defeat, but its proper strategic use can be the difference between an eventual victor and a shortsighted grandstander—as we’ve seen repeatedly over the course of the war in Ukraine, with Russia benefiting from a pragmatic use of retreat while Zelensky loses desperately needed forces in symbolic offensives8. Theory is the method which unravels this superficial contradiction between means and ends, and under this definition, we cannot speak of theory in the proper sense of the word when it is disconnected from practical ends. The conditions of the US require an approach most analogous to what Lenin identifies in What Is To Be Done?—the formation of a newspaper which can disseminate and hone our theory of scientific socialism, but Clausewitz’s work explains that this theory must be a fountainhead of tactical and strategic conclusions, kept constantly flowing through ruthless critique.
Bibliography
Lenin, V.I. and G.Y. Zinoviev. “Socialism and War.” Marxists Internet Archive, 2005. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/s-w/index.htm.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. (p. 141)
Ibid. (p. 141)
Ibid. (p. 154)
Ibid. (p. 169)
Phos, Damon. “Study Military Strategy.” The Red Compass, November 26, 2023.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. (p. 142)
Osborn, Andrew. “Russia’s Planned Kherson Retreat a Double-Edged Sword for Kyiv.” Reuters, November 11, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-planned-kherson-retreat-double-edged-sword-kyiv-2022-11-10/.
Tsurkan, Kate. “Bild: Zelensky, Zaluzhnyi Have Conflicting Views on Bakhmut.” The Kyiv Independent, March 6, 2023. https://kyivindependent.com/bild-zaluzhnyi-and-zelensky-have-conflicting-views-on-bakhmut/.